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1. INTRODUCTION	
Although the bulk of corporate R&D is accounted for by established large corporations, young 
entrepreneurial firms have been responsible for introducing major innovations (e.g. Baumol, 2004). 
Although these young firms are often small, their profile is distinct from typical longer established 
small firms.Young firms are not encumbered by the fear of cannabilizing existing positions 
(Reinganum 1983; Henderson 1993) and are therefore more likely to introduce new disruptive 
innovations, compared to incumbent firms, be they large or small. With their more radical innovations 
these young companies create the scene for new products, technologies and markets, on which other 
firms can build further. Having young companies impeded to innovate, might thus have an important 
impact on an economy’s overall innovative and growth performance. Understanding what the specific 
barriers are these young firms face, is therefore important, even if they are only a small fraction of 
the total population of innovating firms. 
Perhaps the most often discussed barrier for young innovators is access to finance (e.g. Hall, 2005). 
But young innovative firms may also be disproportionally facing difficulties in appropriating the 
returns from their innovations. Being more financially constrained, the cost of building an intellectual 
property (IP) strategy may be too high for them. In addition, young firms may lack the critical scale 
and resources to control complementary downstream assets needed to produce and commercialize the 
innovation. Such control becomes pivotal for appropriation when IP regimes are weak (Teece, 1986; 
Gans, Hsu & Stern, 2002).  
Young innovators often specialize in knowledge production and for these firms IP is vital as most of 
their critical assets are knowledge assets. These firms will need to use IP to certify their technological 
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ability in the market for technology (Arora et al 2001). Likewise, IP is important when searching and 
negotiating with innovation and commercialization partners as well as possible financers (Arora et al 
2001).  
Despite the importance of young companies for the innovative growth performance of nations, despite 
the critical importance of IP for young innovators to appropriate the returns from their innovations, 
and the expected higher problems of young innovative firms when developing an IP strategy, there is 
surprisingly little analysis and evidence on the appropriability strategies of young innovative 
companies. This contribution tries to address the empirical gap.  
In this paper we estimate a series of models to examine how young highly innovative firms 
appropriate the returns from their innovations differently from other innovating firms. The German 
part of the European-wide Community Innovation Survey administered by EUROSTAT (CIS) 
provides the data for our analysis. After controlling for firm and industry characteristics, we find that 
young highly innovative firms are more likely to choose both formal and informal appropriation 
mechanisms. They are particularly more likely to choose secrecy in combination with formal IP. This 
holds especially for those young innovators focusing on R&D and when they introduce more radical 
innovations new to the market. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the background. Section 3 describes the data and 
the methodology. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.  
2. BACKGROUND	
2.1.	How	to	appropriate	the	returns	from	innovation?	
The Resource Based View of the firm in the management literature holds that competitive advantage 
derives from a firm’s ownership or control of “assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm 
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attributes, information, knowledge” that are valuable, rare, inimitable and non- substitutable. The 
ensuing rents must be protected by “isolating mechanisms” or “resource position barriers” 
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Rumelt, 1987; Barney, 1991). When the resource is knowledge, state-enforced 
property rights (patents, trademarks, copyright) and/or secrecy are typically identified as isolating 
mechanisms or position barriers that enhance the firm’s bargaining power, and allow it to appropriate 
the value of its knowledge resources (Reitzig and Puranam, 2009). 
Another strand in the strategy literature that deals with value appropriation asks the question who 
profits from innovation: the initial idea generator or others (Teece, 1986). In this literature, the 
strength of the IP regime is a crucial dimension for identifying whether the innovator can appropriate 
the returns from his ideas. The strength of the IP regime is considered to be exogenous to the firms: 
a tight IP environment is one where the innovator has an “iron clad patent or copyright protection, or 
where the nature of the product is such that trade secrets effectively deny imitators access to the 
relevant knowledge”. Within a tight IP environment, the innovator is almost assured of translating its 
innovation into market value for some period of time. Even if the innovator does not possess the 
desirable endowment of complementary assets, the innovator can be successful as a specialized R&D 
firm or will have, thanks to his iron clad protection of intellectual property, the ability and time to 
affordably access complementary assets. This does not need to be through ownership of the 
complementary assets; but can be through contracting in or cooperation with providers. But IP 
regimes are seldom ironclad. In most cases, when IP regimes are not tight and when complementary 
assets need to be accessed to commercialize the innovation and these assets are highly specialized 
and not easily traded, the innovator needs control, typically through ownership, of the critical 
specialized assets, to appropriate the value of its innovation (Teece 1986).  
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Within the set of mechanisms to protect intellectual property, patents are the most marked and studied 
legal IP rights (see Griliches, 1984 and Hall et al, 2014, for a survey). The cross country and industry 
econometric studies on patenting show that there is a substantial heterogeneity in the propensity of 
firms to patent (see e.g. Pakes and Griliches (1984), De Rassenfosse & van Pottelsberghe (2013)), 
particularly across sectors (Cohen et al., 2001; Cassiman & Veugelers, 2002; Arundel, 2001; Hall et 
al., 2014). This reflects inter alia differences in the protection strength offered by patents across 
industries, being particularly high in “discrete” technologies such as pharmaceuticals where 
knowledge is well codified (Hall et al 2014). 
The evidence available from various firm‐level surveys (most notably the Yale and Community 
Innovation Surveys) shows not only the high variance in the propensity to patent across firms, even 
within industries, but that firms on average rely more on other modes to appropriate the value of their 
innovations rather than patents. Most notably secrecy and exploitation of lead time are found to be 
preferred forms of protection (Cohen et al., 2001; Arundel, 2001; Hall et al, 2014), again with the 
exception of pharmaceuticals and other chemicals where patents are still the favorite tool to secure 
the returns to R&D. But even if patenting is not considered as the best form of protection in all cases, 
the use of patents remains widespread, as witnessed through the stream of applications at patent 
offices. Hall and Ziedonis (2001) call this gap between the rated relative ineffectiveness of patents in 
surveys and their widespread use, the “patent paradox”.  
Other legal IP rights beyond patents include trademarks and copyrights. The creation of a new trade 
mark may enhance the perceived value of innovative products by consumers, and increase their 
loyalty to the pioneering brand. Trademarks and patents thus constitute two distinct means to 
appropriate the benefits of innovation, whose effects are likely to be interrelated, as substitute 
protection modes, but also possibly as complements. Millot and Llerena (2012) examine the latter 
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relationship and find on a set of French publicly traded firms, that patents and trademarks are used in 
complementary fashion in life sciences (pharmaceutical products and health services), but as 
substitutes in the ICT sector (computer, electronic and optical products and electrical equipment). 
Somaya and Graham (2006) employ litigation data on patents, copyrights, and trademarks to study 
overlapping IP protections used by software firms and find evidence of joint use of different types of 
IP used by software firms, which they explain by economies of scale in organizational resources 
deployed for IP management.  
The choice between patents and secrecy as substitute appropriation modes has received particular 
attention in the micro-economic theory literature. Anton and Yao (2004) and Encaoua and Lefouilli 
(2005) both consider the choice between these two mechanisms depending on the patent strength, the 
cost of imitation and the innovation size. A common thread in both models is that weak property 
rights imply disclosure incentives that are relatively stronger for smaller innovations. For a small 
innovation relative to the status quo technology, even a relatively weak patent will discourage 
imitation because the gain to using the new knowledge is insufficient to justify a possible 
infringement payment. Bigger, more radical, innovations are protected more through secrecy as a 
response to the bigger problem of imitation by a competitor.  
2.2.	How	young	firms	appropriate	the	returns	from	innovations		
The literature on how to appropriate the returns from innovation (section 2.1) does typically not 
discuss the position of young innovators. Although young innovators are typically also small, what 
differentiates them most from other innovators, including traditional small firms, is their young age, 
lacking vested positions, retained earnings, experience and reputation. Being un-incumbent makes 
them more likely to introduce more radical big innovators (Henderson (1993); Henderson & Clark 
(1990)). But are young firms relatively disadvantaged compared to incumbents in appropriating the 
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value of their innovations? And are young innovators more likely to choose different modes to 
appropriate the value of their innovations? The literature is surprisingly un-explicit on this. It 
nevertheless provides some useful insights to address the question. 
A point identified in the literature is that for young innovators, IP plays a more critical role compared 
to established companies. According to the Teece (1986) framework, being able to control their 
technological knowhow will be disproportionately important to young innovating firms, as they 
typically lack control over complementary assets. A young innovating firm typically does not (yet) 
possess the relevant specialized and co-specialized complementary assets. "The patents held by a 
small, technologically oriented firm may be its most marketable asset" (Levin et al. 1987, p. 797). 
In the Teece (1986) framework, control of technological knowhow is associated with strong IP 
regimes. In this framework, the strength of the IP regime is determined by the efficacy of legal 
mechanisms of protection (patents, trademarks) and by the nature of technology, identifying the scope 
for secrecy. In both cases the strength of the IP regime is considered to be largely exogenous to the 
firm. When IP regimes are tight, the young innovative firm can avoid expensing to build or acquire 
ownership over the necessary complementary assets. Its IP will give it a strong bargaining chip to 
contract these assets, if available, or cooperate with others better positioned to provide such assets. 
Beyond helping young firms to protect their innovations from imitation or to access complementary 
assets for their innovations, strong IP regimes also facilitate the licensing or sale of IP protected know-
how by the young firm, due to smaller transactions costs when operating on the market for technology. 
A stronger IP system thus facilitates activities of small firms specializing in technological know-how. 
Hall and Ziedonis (2001) argue that the US pro-patent policy in the eighties contributed to an 
increasing number of specialized technology firms focusing on semiconductor design. This is also 
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the case for dedicated biotech firms. Such ‘division of innovative labor’ is closely related to growing 
technology markets in high-tech industries (Arora et al., 2001).  
Beyond pinpointing the importance of IP for young innovators, the literature also provides some 
indication on which IP protection modes would work better for young firms, providing a stronger 
control on technological know-how. The models of Anton & Yao (2004) and Encaoua & Lefouilli 
(2005) discussed supra, would suggest that young firms to the extent they are more likely to introduce 
important big radical innovations compared to the more incremental follow-on innovations by 
incumbents, would have a stronger preference for secrecy over patents.  
Building an IP portfolio will be expensive. For young firms, being cash constrained and faced with 
difficulties in accessing external finance, this may constitute a barrier for developing an effective IP 
strategy. The high costs of patenting are well documented (e.g. van Pottelsberghe and François, 2009). 
A firm not only has to meet the direct monetary expenses associated with the application process but 
it also has to monitor the market for potential infringement and take legal action if needed. While the 
application costs are particularly high in Europe relative to the US, in the US the legal enforcement 
costs associated with IP can be substantial (van Pottelsberghe and François, 2009).  
2.3.	Evidence	on	appropriation	strategies	for	innovation	by	young	firms	
Although the literature clearly shows the importance of IP in determining how much value the 
innovator can capture, and although the literature hints at how this may hold differently for young 
innovative firms, there is surprisingly little empirical analysis on the specific IP strategies of young 
innovative firms.  
The literature that looks specially at young innovative firms, typically looks at their likelihood of 
entry, their post-entry innovative performance and growth (e.g. Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007; Acs 
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and Audretsch, 1988) and more recently Pellegrino et al (2012) for Italy, Czarnitzki & Delanote 
(2013) for Flanders and Garcia-Quevedo et al (2014) for Spain). The literature also by and large 
confirms that young innovators are more likely to introduce more novel, radical innovations 
(Schneider & Veugelers, 2010; Henkel et al, 2015). Less is known on the IP strategies used by these 
young innovators.  
The empirical literature provides some scattered evidence on the critical use of patents for firms at 
start-up stage. The 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey on 1,332 high‐tech start‐ups founded in the US since 
1998 provides interesting evidence of start‐up patenting (Graham et al., 2010). A first finding is the 
different propensity to patent for start-ups across industries. While for bio‐tech start-ups, patenting is 
a vital part of corporate strategy, firms in software try to avoid the patent system. The most important 
reason cited by startups for not patenting is cost, confirming the financial constraints for young firms 
(Graham et al. 2010). However, bio‐tech firms rate concerns about the disclosure of information 
contained in a patent publication as a greater obstacle than costs. This is reminiscent of the importance 
of secrecy for the bigger innovations from bio-tech firms (Anton & Yao (2004) and Encaoua & 
Lefouilli (2005)). They also point out that start‐ups value the reputation effect that patent ownership 
may bring about, helping them in their transactions with other complementary firms or financiers. 
Particularly the latter access to finance effect from patenting for start-ups has been studied (e.g. Shane 
(2001), Lerner (1994), Mann and Sager (2007), Haussler, Harhoff & Mueller (2012) Hsu & Ziedonis 
(2013), Hoenig & Henkel (2013), Conti et al (2013), Munari & Toschi (2015), Lahr & Mina (2016), 
confirming that patents acts as a “signal” of proficiency and innovativeness, allowing bigger and 
faster venture capital funding.  
The available evidence confirms the critical and specific importance of IP. However, most of this 
evidence is on patents and for start-ups. Less is known on which other types of IP strategies young 
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innovators might use and beyond start-up stage. There is however some empirical evidence that looks 
at the use of different IP modes for small sized innovators, which young firms typically are. Arundel 
(2001), using the Eurostat Community Innovation Survey I for six EU countries, found that the 
propensity to patent rises with size, other things equal (see also Hall et al. 2014). When looking at 
the different IP modes, firms are found to systematically regard lead‐time and secrecy as more 
important ways to protect their IP than patents. This holds across different size classes, but is stronger 
for smaller firms: smaller firms regard secrecy as even more important than larger companies. 
Leiponen et al. (2009) using an ad hoc survey of 936 Finnish SMEs also finds that small firms find 
informal means of protection, such as speed to market or secrecy, more important than patenting. 
Only dedicated research SMEs rank patents as the most important method of appropriating innovation 
returns in their field. Also Hall et al (2013), using UK CIS data, find that the informal to formal 
preference decreases with firm size.  
 
All this evidence is supportive of secrecy being relatively more important at small firm size. Although 
young firms will typically also be small and face similar barriers as small innovators, related to a 
smaller critical scale and barriers to finance, they also face specific barriers related to their young age, 
such as lack of reputation and experience. At the same time, young firms are less encumbered by 
protecting existing positions, which makes them more likely to introduce radical rather than 
incremental innovations, which may require different IP strategies. These different barriers and 
incentives for young innovators call for specific evidence on IP strategies used by young innovators, 
differently from small innovators.  
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2.4.	Our	contribution		
Despite the well-argued case of the importance of IP strategies for young firms and the evidence on 
differences in IP modes used by small firms, the issue of whether young innovative firms differ in 
their IP strategies is, as far as we are aware of, not empirically investigated. Using EUROSTAT 
Community Innovation Survey data for Germany, which has information on the use of various IP 
modes as well as the age of the innovators, we try to empirically address this evidence gap1.  
More particularly we will investigate differences in the IP strategies between young small high R&D 
intensive firms and other innovators. In a first stage, we will look at any difference in the use of an 
appropriation strategy in general. Can we confirm, consistent with the Teece (1986) framework that 
young firms are more likely to have a well-developed IP strategy to appropriate returns from their 
innovations? In a second stage, we will look at differences in which IP modes are used for 
appropriating the returns from innovation. Can we confirm in line with Anton & Yao (2004) and 
Encaoua & Lefouilli (2005) that young innovators are more likely to use informal secrecy modes 
rather than formal patenting modes, particularly when they introduce more radical bigger 
innovations?  
Our main research questions are: 
 Would young innovators be more likely to have an IP strategy to protect their knowledge assets 
(which are often their only or major assets)? 
 Would young innovators have more incentives to build an IP portfolio combining different IP 
mechanisms to protect their knowledge assets? Or would they find it more difficult to do so 
(in view of their lack of funding)? 
                                                 
1 The age of the firm is unfortunately not mandatory in the EUROSTAT EU wide organized CIS survey. Only a few 
participating countries, among which Germany, include this information in the questionnaire. 
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 Would young innovative firms rely more on legally enforceable IP (like patents, trademarks 
and copyrights)? Or would they, with their ambitions for major inventions, prefer informal IP 
(secrecy), like in the Anton & Yao (2004) and Encaoua & Lefouilli (2005) models?  
When looking at the specific IP profile of young innovative firms, we will particularly look at those 
that specialize as technology providers, focusing their activities on R&D, as these are more likely to 
rely on IP. We will also look specifically at those firms that introduce more important bigger more 
radical innovations, as these are more likely to prefer secrecy over legal protection.  
We control for other factors that may drive the choice of IP strategy. A most important control is 
sector or technology specificity, as the existing empirical literature strongly shows the strength of the 
IP regime to be sector/technology specific. The theoretical literature also points to correcting for the 
nature of the innovative activities, particularly its level of risk and probability to deliver important 
inventions. We also control for the extent to which the firm is financially constrained, as this may be 
a major impediment for firms to develop a costly IP strategy. To proxy for access to complementary 
assets, we use the extent to which firms rate access to partners for cooperation are a barrier for 
innovation. We will control for group membership. Those that are part of a larger group can use the 
IP expertise of the group and their access to finance, and thus may find it easier to build a full IP 
strategy. They may however also have less need for an IP strategy, if the group provides access to 
complementary assets as alternative mode to appropriate returns from innovation.  
As we want to single out young highly innovative firms as a distinct group of innovators, we want to 
differentiate them from small innovators in general. This is why we also control for firm size. 
Similarly we control for firm age in general and for R&D intensity. This will allow us to looking at 
the extra effect for those firms that combine a young, small and high R&D profile, beyond a mere 
age or scale or R&D intensity effect. This extra effect we will label as the YICs effect (see also 
Schneider & Veugelers (2010)).  
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Our results support that after correcting for other factors, firms that combine a young and small but 
high R&D intensive profile, are more likely to use an IP strategy, particularly combining both formal 
and informal IP mechanisms. Within the portfolio of IP mechanisms, the YICs effect is strongest on 
the secrecy mode. Further analysis shows that the YICs effect for the use of secrecy in combination 
with formal IP is more significantly for those YICs with big, more radical, innovations. 
It is important to note that the analysis presented here has to be handled with care, as the cross 
sectional nature of the CIS sample do not allow to perfectly control for unobserved heterogeneity and 
possible endogeneity issues. The results can therefore not be interpreted as causal (i.e. that a 
combination of young, small and R&D intensity characteristics cause a particular IP choice) but rather 
as evidence of correlation, i.e. that firms with these characteristics are more likely to have a specific 
IP choice, ceteris paribus.  
It is also important to remind the reader that the analysis focuses on Young highly Innovative 
Companies (YICs), which is a specific group of firms that have successfully survived the start-up 
phase. They should therefore not be confound with start-up firms. Our data set does not include the 
much larger group of start-up innovators, a majority of which are not likely to survive and thrive to 
make it into the YICs status we are studying here.  
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3. 	DATA	AND	METHODOLOGY	
3.1.	Sample	
The data used stem from the German part of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) conducted by 
EUROSTAT in European Union Member States in 2005 (CIS-IV)2. 3.4. EUROSTAT-CIS survey data 
are by now a standard data source used for innovation econometrics at the firm level. Mairesse & 
Mohnen (2010) provide a review of the studies using CIS data and a discussion of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the data.  
The CIS survey addresses the innovation strategies of firms, covering quantitative information on 
innovation personnel and budgets as well as qualitative information on the type of innovation strategy 
being used. In addition, the survey contains information on respondent’s motives for innovation, 
perceptions of innovation barriers and use and effectiveness of appropriation strategies. Lastly, the 
survey contains quantitative information on the firm, such as sales, age and employment. It also 
includes the share of sales due to innovations, as a measure of innovation success. The rich set of 
variables included in the CIS survey make it therefore a good dataset to study the research question 
at hand. Although the dataset is rich in variables, its main restriction is the cross-section nature of the 
dataset, limiting the construction of valid control/instrument variables to tackle unobserved 
heterogeneity and endogeneity. The results should therefore be interpreted as correlations, rather than 
being causal. The nature of our dataset also affects our analysis by an evident survivorship/selection 
                                                 
2 The survey is conducted annually by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), infas Institut 
fuer Sozialforschung and ISI Fraunhofer Institute on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Education 
and Research. A detailed description of the survey data and the sampling method can be found in the 
background reports available at ZEW (www.zew.de). 
3 The survey is directed to a stratified sample of companies in manufacturing and services sectors with at least 5 
employees. Although the very small firms are not targeted, the sample nevertheless contains 5% of firms with less than 5 
employees.  
4 We restrict attention to West German firms only, dropping East German observations to avoid a source of heterogeneity 
that is outside our issues of interest. 
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bias: we are not only not considering the vast majority of young firms that failed in the very early 
stages of their life, but also, among the young firms that survived to be in the sample, we focus only 
on those that, being highly innovative, are the most virtuous. 
3.2. Variables	and	empirical	methodology	
3.2.1.	Defining	and	characterizing	YICs		
We empirically characterize young highly innovative companies through a YIC dummy. Firms 
qualify for YIC status using an (extended) EU State Aid definition: an innovation active company 
needs to be less than 10 years old, have less than 250 employees and spend at least 10% of its revenues 
on R&D5. Schneider and Veugelers (2010) show that the innovative profile of YICs does not change 
substantially with small extensions of these criteria. However, extending the definition too much, 
particularly on the age dimension, the unique profile of YICs is diluted.  
Out of our sample of 1393 innovation-active companies, only 103 companies qualify for the YICs 
status using the (extended) EU State Aid definition, representing only 7.4% of all innovation-active 
firms in the sample. YICs are overrepresented in the following sectors: Research, development and 
engineering (24%), ICT services (23%) and Electrical, medical and optical instruments (23%). 
Biotechnology is not so frequent in the German innovation landscape as compared to the US (Table 
1a). YICs are on average almost 6 years old and employ about 25 people (Table 1b), illustrating that 
                                                 
5 Young Innovative Enterprises are defined in the EU State Aid Rules as small Enterprises, less than 6 years old, having 
being “certified’ by external experts on the basis of a business plan, as capable of developing products or processes which 
are technologically new or substantially improved and which carry a risk of technological or commercial failure, or have 
R&D intensity of at least 15% in the last three years or currently (for start-ups). However, there are only 51 YICs in our 
sample when applying this definition. We therefore expand the R&D and age criteria in order to garner more 
observations.. 
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the YICs we are studying are well beyond the initial birth stage. Somewhat less than half of the YICs 
are part of a group6. About two thirds of them are exporting.  
Table 1a&b: Characterizing YICs 
YICs tend on average to specialize on R&D with an average R&D intensity of 73%. But this average 
reflects two types of firms, some which are specialising in R&D and others, as the high standard error 
indicates. The median R&D intensity value is 23%. We will check for differences between High R&D 
YICs, i.e. those with R&D expenditures above the median YICs value and the Low R&D YICs.  
Compared to other innovators, YICs are more likely to introduce innovations that are new to the firm 
and even more so for innovations that are new to the market. In our empirical analysis we want to 
single out firms with bigger, more radical, innovations, which we proxy through those that introduce 
product innovations that are new to the market. To do so we construct a dummy variable BigInnov, 
which takes the value one if the firm has introduced a market novelty. These firms account for 52% 
of our sample firms. Within the group of YICs, a larger share, 65% introduced innovations new to 
the market (BigInnovYICs)  
Although splitting YICs according to whether they specialize in R&D and have big innovations 
allows for interesting hypotheses testing, the small overall number of YICs in the sample limits 
splitting exercises.  
                                                 
6 These could be corporate spinoffs, or independent start-ups which have been acquired in the past.  Unfortunately, the 
CIS survey does not contain information on the corporate history. 
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3.2.2.	Appropriation	strategies	
In line with Hall et al (2014), we empirically distinguish formal IP and informal appropriation 
mechanisms shaping a firm’s ability to exploit its knowledge. The main forms of formal IP are 
patents, trademarks, designs and copyright. Secrecy, lead time, and complexity are subsumed under 
the informal IP heading. We define formal appropriability as a dummy variable that takes on the 
value one if the focal firm applied for a patent, utility patent, design, trademark or for copyright 
protection. Conversely, we define informal appropriability as a binary variable equal to one if firms 
used secrecy, complexity or lead time as means of protection. Although the survey contains 
information not only on actual use of IP mechanisms, but also on how the firms rate the importance 
of the various IP mechanisms, the main analysis will focus mostly on the use, as this is much less 
prone to subjectivity bias. 
3.2.3.	Control	variables	
As our main question of interest is whether young innovative firms differ in their appropriation 
strategy, we include a set of control variables to net out as much as possible any potentially 
confounding factors.  
First, we include the size of the focal firm, measured by the logarithm of employment, and the 
logarithm of firm age. We also control for the input of R&D resources into the firm’s innovative 
process, measured by the ratio of (intramural) R&D expenditures to sales (R&D intensity). Since we 
control for age, size and R&D intensity, a significant positive YICs coefficient would signal that after 
controlling for the effect of being small or being young or being R&D intensive, those firms that 
combine all three characteristics, are more or less likely to use any appropriation strategy. This extra 
effect we will label as the YICs effect.  
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We control for the riskiness of the innovation process by using a survey measure that captures the 
firm’s rating of importance of high risk as an obstacle to innovation (see Cassiman and Veugelers, 
2002). Risk typically characterizes an innovation strategy which goes for important “big” innovations 
or breakthroughs in contrast to a low risk road of small, incremental innovations. We also include a 
variable that captures the basicness of the firms’ R&D, measured as the firm’s rating of importance 
of information from public research institutes and universities relative to the importance of customers 
and suppliers as an information source (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; 2006). More basic R&D 
increases the risk of the innovation process.  
The lack of access to external finance may limit the firm’s ability to develop an IP strategy. But at 
the same time, it may operate as a motive for young and small firms to resort to formal means of 
protection such as patents that may have a certification function and facilitate access to external 
funding. We control for the lack of external finance by using a measure for the firm’s rating of lack 
of external finance as an obstacle to innovation. 
Firms that lack complementary resources and skills to bring their innovations to market, will need to 
go to the market to access these resources or skills, either by acquiring ownership or by forging 
partnerships. For these firms, IP will be important to reduce transaction costs and improve their 
bargaining position. We use the perceived difficulty of finding cooperation partners as a barrier to 
innovation to proxy for firms that lack complementary assets (coop partners). We also check the 
difficulty of finding qualified personnel as an alternative proxy for lack of complementary assets.  
Since the scaling for the variables which use scores of the respondents on factors as impediments to 
innovation may vary across firms, we convert the survey scores (from the zero to three scale) to 
normalized z-scores such that each variable has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. As 
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all of these scoring variables suffer from a possible subjectivity bias, they need to be handled with 
care. 
Finally, we include a dummy for firms that are part of a group (Group), a dummy for exporting firms 
(EXPORT), eleven regional dummies based on the State in which the firm is located and 14 sector 
dummies that were constructed based on their NACE codes, a nomenclature of economic activities 
in the European Community. The sector dummies allow to control for technological opportunities 
and life cycle differences and in casu especially to control for differences between high and low 
appropriation sectors.  
3.2.4.	Empirical	methodology	
We estimate a series of probability models to explore the appropriation choices of YICs. We first 
consider a probit model of whether firms are more likely to choose any type of appropriation 
mechanism (coded as 1) or none (coded as zero). Next, we distinguish between two types of 
appropriation mechanism: formal (patent, utility model, trademark, copyright or design) and informal 
(secrecy, complexity or lead time). We model this (non-exclusive) choice using a bivariate probit 
model that takes into account correlations between the residuals of the two types of appropriation 
measures. We also make multinomial (exclusive) comparisons to investigate whether firms are more 
or less likely to combine formal and informal appropriation strategies rather than to exclusive use one 
or the other type of appropriation strategy or none. We use a multinomial logit model of 
appropriation choice where we define four categories: no appropriation, formal appropriation only, 
strategic appropriation only, or both. Finally, we look at the 4 most important individual IP modes: 
patents, trademarks, secrecy and lead time. We run multivariate probit models that allow us to 
model each of the 4 appropriation choices in separate equations, but taking their correlation into 
account. 
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A fully fledged analysis of complementarity of IP strategies is beyond the scope of the analysis in 
view of the data at hand. Our data only allow looking at the combination of IP strategies at the firm 
level and not at the invention level. We also cannot assess complementarity using a productivity 
analysis, i.e. checking whether firms that combine IP strategies will be more successful compared to 
those firms that use single IP strategies, as we are lacking any good performance measure for the 
value capture capacity from IP strategies. 
4. RESULTS	
4.1.	Descriptive	analysis	
4.1.1.	YICs	and	appropriation	strategies	
The descriptive statistics in Table 2a show a significantly higher reported use of appropriation 
strategies by YICs as compared to other innovators7 which confirms our expectations that 
appropriation strategies are more important for YICs. This holds particularly and is highly significant 
for the use of informal protection mechanisms, particularly secrecy and lead time. On the use of 
formal protection mechanisms, YICs display no significant different use with respect to patents and 
copyrights. These first descriptives on the modes of IP being used by YICs are already supportive of 
the predictions from the models of Anton & Yao (2004) and Encaoua & Lefouilli (2005), suggesting 
a preference for secrecy for YICs, with their more likely bigger innovations.  
Table 2a: YICs and appropriation strategies – use 
 
                                                 
7 The CIS questionnaire also asks respondents to rate the various appropriation mechanisms on their importance.  These 
results show that there are no strongly significant differences in the reported importance of informal mechanisms for 
appropriating returns between YICs and other innovators, conditional on the mechanisms being used. The difference 
seems therefore only reflected in whether they use mechanisms or not. In the remainder of the analysis we will only look 
at whether or not mechanisms have been used, rather than on how important mechanisms were rated by the respondents.  
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When looking at the use of both informal and formal protection mechanisms simultaneously (Table 
2b), we find YICs to be significantly less present in the “no protection” case. They are less relying 
on “only formal” protection mechanisms, but they are significantly more combining both formal and 
informal protection mechanisms. This suggests a higher importance for informal protection, but in 
combination with legal mechanisms, thus supporting the complementary use of informal and formal 
protection mechanisms for YICs, an issue which we will be exploring in more depth in the 
econometric analysis.  
Table 2b: YICs and appropriation strategies: combining formal and informal 
 
4.1.2.	Control	variables	
Table 3 looks at the differences between YICs and other innovators on the control variables capturing 
various dimensions of the innovation process.  
Table 3: Innovation Profile of YICs  
YICs score higher on riskiness and basicness, confirming their early stage high uncertainty innovative 
profile with more scope for important inventions. They experience a significantly higher lack of 
external funding, reflecting their higher financial constraints. YICs rate the search for partnerships as 
a more critical obstacle as compared to other innovators. This is consistent with them lacking 
complementary assets, for which they need to look for partners. A related barrier “lack of qualified 
personnel”, is rated somewhat higher by YICs, but on this barrier YICs do not score significantly 
different from other innovators.  
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4.2.	Econometric	results	
4.2.1. YICs	and	IP	
Table 4a reports the marginal effects of a probit model where the dependent variable takes the value 
one if the sample firm used any type of appropriation strategy. The results show that larger firms, 
firms being part of a group, exporting, firms with a more basic R&D profile are more likely to be 
using an appropriation strategy.  
When controlling for the effect of firm size, age and R&D intensity, firms combining a small, young 
and high R&D profile (the YICs effect), are more likely to use an appropriation strategy (col. 1). 
Once we also control for the nature of the innovation strategy (col 2), particularly their basicness, the 
YICs effect loses significance, suggesting that the higher basicness profile of YICs, which is 
associated with higher scope for spillover effects, makes them more prone to use an appropriation 
strategy. The perceived lack of external finance does not play out significantly in the use of 
appropriation strategies, probably as this construct, although having high values, does not differ much 
among the sample firms.  
Columns (3) and (4) split the YICs according to their R&D intensity (above or below the median). 
The results show that the YICs effect holds only for those YICs with high R&D intensities, while 
there is no significant YICs effect for those YICs with lower R&D intensities. This is consistent with 
the view that appropriability is particularly important for YICs specializing as technological know-
how firms.  
Table 4a: Probit models of appropriation choice 
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The bivariate probit analysis looks at the probability of using formal mechanisms versus informal 
ones to appropriate the returns from innovation. The bivariate probit model takes into account any 
correlation between formal and informal protection. Table 4b reports the marginal success probability 
for each equation. The results confirm that the use of different types of appropriation is indeed 
correlated, even after correcting for determining factors, suggesting that both strategies are 
complementary at the firm level.  
Larger firms, more R&D intensive firms and firms part of a group and exporting are more likely to 
use formal mechanisms as well as informal mechanisms, while younger firms are more likely to use 
informal mechanisms. After correcting for these firm characteristics, YICs which combine a young 
age with a small size and a high R&D intensity, are found to be significantly more likely to use formal 
as well as informal protection mechanisms. We thus have a significant YICs effect in the choice of 
both formal and informal IP mechanisms, with the marginal effects for both choices being of similar 
size. 
Table 4b: Bivariate probit – Formal and informal IP mechanisms 
As formal and informal protection mechanisms are so closely aligned at the firm level, we test in a 
multinomial specification the probability of using a combination of formal and informal mechanisms, 
compared to the cases of an exclusive use of formal or informal mechanism. In Table 4c we show the 
change in probability of each outcome type induced by a change in the right-hand side variable, 
holding all other variables constant, so the rows sum to zero. This multinomial analysis confirms that 
large, R&D intensive and group member and exporting firms are more likely to combine formal and 
informal appropriation mechanisms. Also firms in need of cooperation partners are significantly more 
likely to use a combination of formal and informal mechanisms, as well as those firms that have more 
basic R&D projects. On top of these effects, we find a significant YICs effect, as firms that combine 
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a young, small and high R&D intensive profile are more likely to choose a combination of formal 
and informal mechanisms.  
Table 4c: Multinomial logit model of appropriation choice 
 
All these results so far indicate a significant YICs effect, as the firms combining a young age with a 
small size and a highly innovative profile are more likely to use a full appropriation strategy, 
combining formal and informal protection mechanisms.  
We further check the sensitivity of the results with respect to the characterizing of the group of YIC 
firms. Rerunning the analysis reported in Tables 4a-b-c with alternative definitions for YICs shows 
that Young SMEs not necessarily high R&D intensive (N=314), have no significantly different IP 
strategy compared to other innovating firms. Also highly innovative SMEs not necessarily young 
(N=244) have no significantly different IP strategy from other innovators. But young high R&D 
intensive firms, not necessarily SMEs (N=116) 8 do have a significantly higher likelihood compared 
with other innovators to have an IP strategy and to combine formal and informal protection 
mechanisms. It therefore seems to be the combination of age and high R&D intensity characteristic 
that matters most for the specific YICs effect. This is in line with the results that within the YICs 
group, the results on different IP strategies is driven by the subgroup of YICs that have an above 
median R&D intensity.  
                                                 
8 It should be noted that in this group of 116 firms,  only thirteen firms are not SMEs, as young firms typically are small 
sized.   
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4.2.2. Individual	IP	modes	
We continue the analysis by looking at the most important individual protection mechanisms: patents, 
secrecy, lead time and trademarks. We look at these 4 choices in a multivariate probit.9 The results 
clearly indicate the need to consider these choices encompassing, as all pairwise correlations are 
significant. Table 5a reports the estimation results and Table 5b the change in predicted probabilities 
as the YICs dummy changes from zero to one.10  
Large firms and more R&D intensive firms are more likely to choose patents, secrecy, lead time as 
well as trademarks. Age again has no significant effect, except for young firms being more likely to 
choose lead time. On top of these effects, firms that combine a young, small and R&D intensive 
profile are more likely to use secrecy. There is no YICs effect for other IP modes.  
Table 5a: Multivariate probit on appropriation mode choice 
When looking at individual IP modes, it is therefore particularly secrecy which stands out as the 
differential protection mode of use for young, small, highly innovative companies (see Table 5b). 
This would be consistent with the more important nature of their innovations, which would render 
secrecy more important as IP mode, as suggested by Anton & Yao (2004) and Encaoua & Lefouilli 
(2005). The next section will further explore this hypothesis. 
Table 5b: Marginal effects of YICs on appropriation mode choice 
 
                                                 
9 We estimate the 4-equation probit models by the method of simulated maximum likelihood, using the Geweke-
Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator to evaluate the 4-dimensional Normal integrals in the likelihood function (see e.g., 
Greene, 2000). We use 50 draws of random variates to calculate the simulated likelihood. 
10 We do not report all marginal effects at this is computationally too intensive 
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4.2.3. YICs	introducing	big	innovations:	new	to	the	market	
Would bigger innovations call for a different appropriation strategy and are YICs different in their 
appropriation strategy because they are more likely to be the “big” innovators? To test the Anton & 
Yao (2004) and Encaoua & Lefouilli (2005) prediction more closer, we will look at the size of the 
innovations introduced by the firms, as proxied by them introducing innovations new to the market 
(BigInnov and BigInnovYICs). Within the set of informal appropropriation modes, we will look at 
secrecy more particularly.  
The bivariate probit analysis (Table 6a) shows that “big” innovators with innovations new to the 
market are more likely to choose secrecy, as well as formal protection. In addition to this effect, for 
YICs with big innovations, the secrecy effect is significantly more important. YICs with big 
innovations are also more likely to choose formal protection, but this effect is not-significantly 
different from other Big Innovators. YICs with small innovations are not significantly more likely to 
choice formal protection nor secrecy. 
Table 6a: Bivariate probit – formal protection and secrecy; by size of the innovation 
To look at the complementarity between formal protection and secrecy further, we use multinomial 
logit estimation for firms that report an appropriation mechanism, excluding those that do not use any 
appropriation method (Table 6b). The multinomial logit estimation shows that firms with bigger 
innovations are more likely to use secrecy in combination with formal protection. This holds 
particularly for YICs with big innovations.  
Table 6b. Multinomial model of appropriation choice of YICs: by “size of the innovation” 
Our results therefore only partly support the theory predictions from Anton & Yao (2004) and 
Encaoua & Lefouilli (2005): the results support that “big innovators”, and particularly young big 
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innovators, are, more likely to resort to secrecy. But secrecy is not a substitute for formal protection. 
On the contrary, secrecy is deployed in complement with formal protection for “big innovations”.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS	
There is little analysis and evidence on the appropriability strategies of young innovative companies. 
This is particularly surprising given the importance of young companies for the innovative growth 
performance of nations and despite the specific barriers and incentives that young innovative firms 
face when developing an IP strategy. Using German CIS data, which has information on the use of 
various IP modes as well as the age of the innovators, we try to address this gap. We are particularly 
interested to see in line with the Teece (1986) framework, whether an IP strategy is more important 
for young innovative firms to control their knowledge assets, which are often their major assets. And 
with their ambitions for major inventions, would they prefer informal IP (secrecy) over formal IP 
(patents or trademarks), like in the Anton & Yao (2004) and Encaoua & Lefouilli (2005) models? 
When looking at young innovative firms, we single out those that specialize in R&D, and those that 
introduce “big” innovations. We control for a whole range of other factors that may drive the choice 
of IP strategy, including technology specificity, the nature of the innovative activities and financial 
constraints.  
Our results strongly support that after controlling for firm size, age and R&D intensity, the additional 
effect of being simultaneously young, small and high R&D intensive is associated with a higher 
likelihood to use an IP strategy. The higher likelihood of YICs to use IP strategies holds most strongly 
for those YICs with specialize more on knowledge creation, in line with Teece (1986).  
When looking at the different IP modes, we find that YICs are particularly more likely to combine 
both formal and informal IP mechanisms. Innovators with big, new to the market innovations, are 
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significantly more likely to complement formal IP protection with secrecy. This holds particularly for 
YICs with big innovations. This use of secrecy is in support of the Anton & Yao (2004) and Encaoua 
& Lefouilli (2005) models, but not as an alternative to formal protection, but rather as a complement. 
The results, although interesting, have evident limits, mainly caused by the nature of the dataset used. 
Although the Community Innovation Survey allows to characterize and control for many dimensions 
of the firms involved, its cross-sectional nature exclude a causal identification. Moreover, the young 
innovators that can be studied in the sample are only a select group of surviving successful young 
firms beyond start-up phase. 
Further research is clearly needed on this issue. First, extending the research to other countries would 
allow for more heterogeneity in the characteristics of the IP legislation. The availability of CIS-like 
information for other countries facilitates such cross-country comparisons. Extending the sample to 
include more observations for young innovators (without comprising their specific characteristics), 
would allow for more robust analyses of the heterogeneity within this subsample.  
 
As empirical research at the firm level cannot tell whether different appropriation modes are used for 
different types of firm inventions, a useful complement to the firm level analysis is information at the 
invention level. This would allow looking at which IP mechanism is most suitable for which particular 
invention, particularly comparing more risky, radical, bigger inventions to the incremental smaller 
inventions.  
 
Ultimately we are interested in how the differential use of IP mechanisms by firms translates into 
static and dynamic performance differences at the firm level and finally at the economy level. It would 
be particularly interesting to see whether the big innovations of young small R&D intensive firms 
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that combine formal and informal IP, including particularly secrecy, are also more likely to be 
successful for the firm. Such an analysis requires extending the survey data to performance measures, 
going beyond a cross-section analysis to properly tackle endogeneity issues.  
 
The complementarity between various appropriation modes also deserves further analysis, in general 
and in particular for young innovative companies. Beyond assessing complementarity between IP 
modes from joint use, this analysis should be extended to a productivity analysis, i.e. checking 
whether a joint use of several appropriation mechanisms is more effective for firms and especially 
for young highly innovative firms to capture more value from their innovations and which specific 
combinations of IP strategies leads to an enhanced appropriation of returns from innovation.  
 
As the analysis still requires further research to establish causal relations and performance effects 
from IP choices by young highly innovative firms, any policy or managerial implications should be 
handled with care at this stage of the analysis. Nevertheless, as the results do strongly support that IP 
is more critical and specific for successful young highly innovative firms, removing barriers to IP 
strategy development should be on a policy agenda that aims at supporting young innovative firms to 
scale up to successful leading innovators. And as the results suggest that this holds particularly for 
those young innovators that focus on technology development as their core business and especially 
those focusing on more radical innovative projects, policy attention for IP development will be 
especially important to support big innovation projects. The results on complementarity of IP modes 
suggest that policy and managerial attention for IP should not only focus on formal IP protection 
modes, such as patents. Young innovators with a more radical innovation focus should also not be 
constrained to access resources needed to develop complementary informal IP protection modes, such 
as lead time, secrecy and complexity. A challenge for policy is the secrecy component of IP 
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protection. If secrecy proves to be part of the best way for young innovators to appropriate the private 
returns from their “bigger” inventions, how to square this with assuring positive technology spillovers 
on the wider community to reach the social returns from these “bigger” inventions? In any case, a 
better understanding of the complementarity between the various IP modes chosen by the firm, i.e. 
how firms combine secrecy with patents and lead time is needed for better policy making. We hope 
we have contributed to making this research agenda more center stage.  
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Table 1a: Characterizing YICs: Industry classification 
 YICs Other Innovators 
 Frequency % Frequency % 
1 Food and tobacco  0 0.00 41 3.18 
2 Textiles and leather  1 0.97 38 2.95 
3 Wood, paper, and publishing  6 5.83 99 7.68 
4 Chemicals and petroleum  8 7.77 150 11.64 
5 Glass, ceramics, and furnitures  0 0.00 38 2.95 
6 Metal  2 1.94 142 11.02 
7 Machinery and equipment  2 1.94 134 10.40 
8 Electrical machinery, medical, and optical instruments 24 23.30 179 13.89 
9 Motor vehicles  4 3.88 49 3.80 
10 Sales of motor vehicles, wholesale, and retail trade  1 0.97 65 5.04 
11 Transportation and communication  1 0.97 76 5.90 
12 ICT  24 23.30 73 5.66 
13 Research, experimental development and engineering 25 24.27 77 5.97 
14 Consulting  5 4.85 128 9.93 
 
Table 1b: Characterizing YICs: size, age and innovation profile 
  All innovators     YICs       Other innovators     
  N Mean median s.d. N Mean median s.d. N Mean median s.d. 
Age 1393 35.5 20 37.6 103 5.8 5 2.4 1290 37.9 22 38.1 
Employment 1393 1228.8 85 9699.1 103 25.5 12 33.7 1290 1324.8 103 10072.9
R&D intensity 1393 0.108 0.033 0.877 103 0.731 0.231 3.146 1290 0.058 0.028 0.118 
Part of a Group (0/1) 1378 0.66  0.474 101 0.446  0.5 1277 0.677  0.468 
Export (0/1) 1317 0.685  0.464 84 0.666  0.474 1148 0.712  0.452 
Introduced firm novelties (0/1) 1150 0.546  0.498 89 0.662  0.475 1061 0.537  0.498 
Introduced Market novelties (0/1) 1154 0.517   0.499 89 0.651   0.479 1065 0.506   0.5 
Introduced firm novelties but no market novelties 1132 0.206  0.405 87 0.184  0.389 1045 0.208  0.406 
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Table 2a: YICs and appropriation strategies – use 
                                      
  YICs Use s.d 
Other
Innov Use s.d. 
Mean Difference 
YICs-other innov. 
Formal protection 101 64.4% 0.481 1242 55.4% 0.497 0.090 * 
- Patent 97 39.2% 0.491 1217 38.6% 0.487 0.006 
- Utility model 93 12.9% 0.337 1171 29.6% 0.457 -0.167 *** 
- Design 93 3.2% 0.178 1143 7.0% 0.255 -0.038 
- Trademark 98 42.9% 0.497 1180 31.4% 0.464 0.114 ** 
- Copyright 96 12.5% 0.332 1140 14.8% 0.355 -0.023 
Informal protection 101 84.2% 0.367 1201 69.4% 0.461 0.148 *** 
- Secrecy 99 75.8% 0.431 1169 55.1% 0.498 0.207 *** 
- Complexity 95 30.5% 0.463 1119 26.1% 0.439 0.044 
- Lead time 99 76.8% 0.424 1176 59.6% 0.491 0.172 *** 
***, **, * reflects significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level 
Table 2b: YICs and appropriation strategies: combining formal and informal 
  YICs  Other innovators mean difference 
Only informal protection 21.36% 19.92% -1.44% 
Only formal protection 1.94% 6.43% 4.49% * 
Formal and informal protections 61.17% 44.42% -16.75% *** 
No protection 13.59% 22.09% 8.50% ** 
***, **, * reflects significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level 
 
Table 3: Innovation Profile of YICs  
    YICs Other innovators  
  Label Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Difference   
Basicness (score) BASIC 0.814 0.48 0.612 0.297 -0.202 *** 
Risk (score) HRISK 2.117 0.937 1.72 0.993 -0.397 *** 
Lack of external funding (score) HFIN 2.042 1.041 1.209 1.106 -0.833 *** 
Difficulty of finding cooperation partners (score) HPAR 0.989 0.898 0.782 0.875 -0.208 ** 
Difficulty of finding qualified personnel (score) HPER 1.074 0.097 1.167 0.026 -0.092  
***, **, * reflects significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. “Score” indicates that the variables are expressed on a scale from 0 to 3 
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Table 4a: Probit models of appropriation choice 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
VARIABLES dy/dx se dy/dx se dy/dx se dy/dx se 
         
Log(age) -0.011 (0.013) -0.012 (0.013) -0.011 (0.013) -0.012 (0.013) 
Log(employment) 0.051*** (0.008) 0.052*** (0.008) 0.050*** (0.008) 0.051*** (0.008) 
R&D intensity 0.067 (0.093) 0.052 (0.089) 0.015 (0.088) 0.004 (0.047) 
BASIC (z-score)   0.025* (0.013)   0.024* (0.013) 
HRISK (z-score)   0.019 (0.012)   0.019 (0.012) 
HFIN (z-score)   0.019 (0.014)   0.018 (0.014) 
HPAR (z-score)   0.007 (0.012)   0.007 (0.012) 
EXPORT 0.115*** (0.032) 0.114*** (0.033) 0.117*** (0.032) 0.115*** (0.033) 
Group 0.060** (0.026) 0.075*** (0.026) 0.060** (0.026) 0.076*** (0.026) 
YICs 0.102** (0.040) 0.081* (0.043)     
YICs High R&D     0.160*** (0.041) 0.159*** (0.040) 
YICs Low R&D     0.062 (0.052) 0.030 (0.056) 
         
Observations 1,141  1,031  1,141  1,031  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Industry and regional fixed effects are included but not reported 
 
Table 4b: Bivariate probit – Formal and informal IP mechanisms  
 (1) (2) 
 Formal Informal 
VARIABLES dy/dx se dy/dx Se 
     
Log(age) -0.005 (0.015) -0.024* (0.014) 
Log(employment) 0.080*** (0.009) 0.058*** (0.009) 
R&D intensity 0.220* (0.115) 0.233* (0.123) 
BASIC (z-score) 0.039*** (0.014) 0.009 (0.014) 
HRISK (z-score) 0.012 (0.015) 0.021 (0.014) 
HFIN (z-score) 0.009 (0.016) -0.009 (0.015) 
HPAR (z-score) 0.023 (0.014) 0.024* (0.013) 
Group 0.081*** (0.031) 0.069** (0.029) 
EXPORT 0.153*** (0.039) 0.113*** (0.036) 
YICs 0.133** (0.055) 0.116** (0.050) 
     
Observations 1,031 
Rho 0.494*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Industry and regional fixed effects are included but not reported 
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Table 4c: Multinomial logit model of appropriation choice 
 No appropriation  Formal only Informal only Both formal and informal 
VARIABLES dy/dx s.e. dy/dx s.e. dy/dx s.e. dy/dx s.e. 
         
Log(age) 0.013 (0.013) 0.013 (0.009) -0.006 (0.014) -0.019 (0.015) 
Log(employment) -0.051*** (0.009) -0.004 (0.005) -0.026*** (0.009) 0.082*** (0.009) 
R&D intensity 0.021 (0.110) -0.253* (0.143) -0.165 (0.127) 0.397*** (0.131) 
BASIC (z-score) -0.025* (0.013) 0.013* (0.008) -0.017 (0.014) 0.029** (0.015) 
HRISK (z-score) -0.018 (0.012) -0.000 (0.009) 0.006 (0.014) 0.013 (0.015) 
HFIN (z-score) -0.017 (0.014) 0.024** (0.009) 0.011 (0.015) -0.017 (0.016) 
HPAR (z-score) -0.007 (0.012) -0.016* (0.009) -0.015 (0.013) 0.038*** (0.014) 
Group -0.072*** (0.026) 0.006 (0.018) -0.010 (0.028) 0.076** (0.031) 
EXPORT -0.116*** (0.033) 0.007 (0.022) -0.044 (0.035) 0.154*** (0.040) 
YICs -0.083* (0.044) -0.042 (0.031) -0.031 (0.052) 0.156*** (0.058) 
         
Observations 1,031 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Industry and regional fixed effects are included but not reported 
 
 
 
 
Table 5a: Multivariate probit on appropriation mode choice 
  Patent Secrecy Lead Time Trademark 
  coef.   s.e. coef.  s.e. coef.  s.e. coef.  s.e.
Log(age) -0.049 
 0.055 -0.081 0.050 -0.121 ** 0.049 -0.075  0.051 
Log(employment) 0.396 *** 0.039 0.212 *** 0.033 0.187 *** 0.032 0.225 *** 0.033 
R&D intensity 1.359 *** 0.462 0.714 * 0.411 0.995 ** 0.433 0.874 ** 0.373 
BASIC (z-score) 0.133 ** 0.053 0.029 0.048 -0.020 0.047 0.116 ** 0.049 
HRISK (z-score) -0.016 0.057 0.077 0.050 0.085 * 0.050 -0.005 0.051 
HFIN (z-score) 0.107 * 0.059 0.057 0.054 -0.009 0.053 0.064 0.055 
HPAR (z-score) 0.075 0.054 0.092 * 0.048 0.077 0.048 0.016 0.050 
Group -0.036 0.118 0.158 0.101 0.205 ** 0.100 0.234 ** 0.109 
EXPORT 0.647 *** 0.151 0.288 ** 0.119 0.348 *** 0.118 0.246 * 0.130 
YICs 0.077 0.231 0.551 ** 0.219 0.242 0.218 0.267 0.210 
Constant -3.585 *** 0.508 -1.472 *** 0.421 -0.904 ** 0.407 -1.060 *** 0.417 
  
Observations 956 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Industry and regional fixed effects are included but not reported 
The variance-covariance matrix of the cross-equation error terms shows (standard errors in parentheses) rho21= 0.519*** ; rho31=0.368*** ; 
rho41=0.439***; rho32=0.690***; rho42=0.268***; rho43=0.299 *** 
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Table 5b: Marginal effects of YICs on appropriation mode choice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6a: Bivariate probit – formal protection and secrecy; big innovators 
 Formal protection Secrecy 
VARIABLES dy/dx se dy/dx Se 
     
Log(age) -0.001 (0.017) 0.002 (0.018) 
Log(employment) 0.053*** (0.011) 0.031*** (0.011) 
R&D intensity 0.216 (0.152) 0.181 (0.167) 
BASIC (z-score) 0.026 (0.016) -0.006 (0.017) 
HRISK (z-score) 0.014 (0.017) -0.004 (0.018) 
HFIN (z-score) -0.016 (0.018) -0.002 (0.019) 
HPAR (z-score) 0.006 (0.016) 0.031* (0.017) 
Group 0.018 (0.035) 0.021 (0.037) 
EXPORT 0.113** (0.050) 0.002 (0.046) 
BigInnov 0.063* (0.033) 0.068** (0.034) 
BigInnov YICs 0.051 (0.072) 0.136** (0.060) 
Non-BigInnov YICs 0.055 (0.087) 0.042 (0.104) 
     
rho  -0.204***   
Observations  698 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mode 
Marg. Effect 
of YICs 
Patent 0.019 
Secrecy 0.167 
Lead time 0.078 
Trademark 0.086 
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Table 6b. Multinomial model of appropriation choice of YICs: by “size of the innovation” 
 Formal protection Secrecy Formal and secrecy Other 
VARIABLES dy/dx se dy/dx se dy/dx se dy/dx se 
         
Log(age) 0.012 (0.016) 0.014 (0.017) -0.011 (0.019) -0.015 (0.010) 
Log(employment) -0.005 (0.010) -0.027** (0.011) 0.056*** (0.012) -0.025*** (0.007) 
R&D intensity -0.074 (0.155) -0.106 (0.141) 0.269 (0.165) -0.089 (0.143) 
BASIC (z-score) 0.008 (0.015) -0.033** (0.017) 0.019 (0.018) 0.006 (0.010) 
HRISK (z-score) 0.009 (0.016) -0.009 (0.016) 0.004 (0.019) -0.004 (0.010) 
HFIN (z-score) 0.020 (0.017) 0.031* (0.017) -0.033* (0.020) -0.018* (0.010) 
HPAR (z-score) -0.041** (0.016) -0.010 (0.015) 0.045** (0.018) 0.007 (0.009) 
Group -0.065* (0.037) -0.063* (0.034) 0.090** (0.041) 0.038** (0.017) 
EXPORT 0.003 (0.044) -0.097** (0.047) 0.111** (0.055) -0.016 (0.025) 
BigInnov -0.038 (0.031) -0.035 (0.031) 0.101*** (0.037) -0.028 (0.018) 
BigInnov YICs -0.079 (0.060) 0.031 (0.075) 0.109* (0.055) -0.061*** (0.009) 
Non-BigInnov YICs -0.057 (0.090) -0.057 (0.075) 0.128 (0.103) -0.014 (0.039) 
         
Observations 698 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Industry and regional fixed effects are included but not reported 
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